Who owns Europe's industry? The answer is increasingly pointing to Beijing

When it comes to technology metals such as gallium, germanium, and hafnium, simply owning a deposit is not enough. What also matters is the ability to separate, purify, and recycle these metals and make them available to industry. Only then can strategic production and processing capacity be established.
One such facility is located in the Harz region. Today, it is wholly owned by a Chinese corporation. In 2020, Vital Materials acquired the facilities of the insolvent German manufacturer PPM Pure Metals in Langelsheim and established Vital Pure Metal Solutions as a wholly owned subsidiary.
High-purity germanium, gallium, and other technology metals are produced and recycled there. They are used in compound semiconductors, infrared optics, sensor technology, and thermal imaging. This is not a minority stake, as in the case of the Tollerort container terminal in Hamburg, but rather full control over a German facility with precisely the capabilities Europe needs to achieve greater independence.
In Austria, too, new production capacity for a critical commodity is currently being established under Chinese control. The Chinese technology group JP Tech is establishing a production facility in Bad Leonfelden for high-purity hafnium, which is needed for applications including aerospace, semiconductors, and nuclear technology. While this does give Europe new processing capabilities, the decisions regarding investment and capacity once again rest with a Chinese corporation.

China’s influence extends far beyond commodities. It encompasses robotics, mechanical engineering, semiconductors, electricity, agricultural technology, and the metals trade. According to data from the European Commission, nearly 49,300 companies in the European Union were under Chinese influence or control in 2022.
About 31,900 of these companies were under Chinese control, control was possible in another 9,000, and 4,700 had Chinese minority shareholders. In Germany alone, there were 8,531 such companies. The Commission’s definition includes both China and Hong Kong. The number seems small, as it accounts for only 0.2 percent of all companies in the EU.
What is striking is where these investments are concentrated. According to the European Commission, the Chinese government controlled 336 companies in the electricity sector and 84 in the semiconductor sector, 55 of which were in Germany. This influence thus extends into sectors where technology, production capacity, and security of supply are particularly critical.

The following cases illustrate how widely this presence is spread across Europe’s industrial base and how often it affects sensitive sectors.

This isn’t just about a few Chinese investments on the fringes of the economy. Their influence extends into sectors without which Europe’s industry cannot function: raw materials processing, key technologies, energy supply, agriculture, and the trade in critical metals.

A Chinese owner does not have to shut down a business to exert power. He makes decisions regarding investments, research, and patents. He can prioritize the delivery of scarce commodities to other plants or customers. Where Europe lacks an equivalent alternative, a business decision becomes a source of political vulnerability.
The EU’s exemption for Kyiv illustrates just how real this dependence is. Ukraine is permitted to use part of a European defense loan to purchase Chinese drone components because European or other approved suppliers cannot provide the necessary parts quickly enough.
This is precisely why negotiations with Beijing are so difficult. When it comes to security issues, sanctions, or unfair trade practices, Europe cannot simply take a hard line without also having to consider the consequences for its own supply chain. As long as key commodities, components, and production steps come from China, Europe cannot negotiate from a position of strength. Therefore, having its own production capacities, alternative supply chains, and strategic reserves does not amount to isolationism. They are the prerequisites for engaging seriously with China as a partner and, if necessary, being able to challenge it.

For three generations, Germany has enjoyed prosperity. This prosperity rested on three pillars: affordable energy, industrial innovation, and open markets with reliable supply chains. Commodities and intermediate goods were available when needed, and the world bought what German companies made from them. This foundation is now beginning to crumble. Affordable energy is a thing of the past, and the supply chains that functioned seamlessly for decades are now being used as leverage. Where both are lacking, innovative strength also comes under pressure, as it requires materials, capacity, and planning certainty.
Europe’s dependence on Russian gas alone has cost it a great deal of money, time, and political leeway. It is not the only such dependency: when it comes to uranium and nuclear fuel, Russia remains a key player in parts of the European supply chain. When it comes to cloud computing, software, artificial intelligence, and key military capabilities, Europe still relies heavily on the U.S. China is the primary supplier of many critical commodities and their processing.
These dependencies can have serious consequences: Europe might no longer be able to decide on its own how to safeguard its industry, its energy supply, or its security.
But blaming China for the dependence on commodities and key industries is not a solution. Beijing has recognized these gaps and strategically exploited them. Europe has failed to close them in a timely manner.
Our mistake lies in still treating strategic production and processing capacities as ordinary economic goods.

A crisis does nothing to improve this situation. Recovery begins when Europe acknowledges this unpleasant reality and starts building its own alternatives again: through investments in raw material projects, processing, recycling, strategic reserves, and industrial capacity.
This does not mean self-sufficiency, nor does it mean isolation. It means regaining the ability to act when partners fail, markets come under pressure, or political conflicts turn supply chains into weapons.