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RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY | 16.11.2026

The China Trap: Those who hedge their bets on commodities will pay more. Those who don't risk losing everything.

The factory gate in front of an industrial facility, locked with a chain and padlock; in front of it, a newspaper with headlines about raw material shortages and export controls.

“Supply disruptions of a commodity can bring entire production lines to a standstill,” the Handelsblatt recently warned. So why aren’t companies taking more decisive steps to prepare? On November 11, the German government presented its plans to reduce dependence on raw materials. But to do so, it must also adjust economic incentives: Companies that take precautions shouldn’t be the ones left holding the short end of the stick in price wars.

Why Companies Are Buying in China Despite the Risks

As recently as November 12, Chinese President Xi Jinping described reunification with Taiwan as an “unwavering historical mission.” While Beijing officially seeks a peaceful solution, it does not rule out the use of military force. A conflict could severely disrupt the supply of critical commodities. So why do companies remain dependent on China, even though they are aware of such risks? A simplified calculation illustrates the dilemma:

Let’s assume a company needs a commodity for which it can spend no more than 70 cents per unit on a long-term basis. Anything above that would make its production unprofitable. A Chinese supplier charges 50 cents, but there is an assumed 50 percent risk of default during the period under consideration. In the model, an alternative supply chain delivers without any risk of default but charges one euro. In this example, an unresolved supply disruption leads to bankruptcy. So does consistently paying a higher price. The company is therefore not choosing between risk and security, but between a possible bankruptcy and a certain one.

Model comparison at a cost threshold of 70 cents: China delivers for 50 cents with a 50 percent risk of default; the reliable alternative costs one euro. Both options carry a risk of insolvency.

Affordable and safe don't have to be mutually exclusive

Why not simply stockpile more inexpensive material from China? Because this approach also has its limits: According to the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, export licenses with quantity restrictions make it difficult to build up large stockpiles. Therefore, it makes sense to continue meeting current demand inexpensively from China while building up additional reserves through independent supply chains. Our company could leverage the price advantage here: 50 cents cover our current needs. The remaining 20 cents go toward additional commodities from the independent—but more expensive—supply chain. After five uninterrupted purchasing cycles, the inventory is sufficient for one production cycle. Storage and financing costs are not factored in for now. This does not provide long-term security, but it does create an effective buffer that can bridge supply disruptions. But what happens if competitors choose not to take these precautions and can therefore offer lower prices?

The Prisoner's Dilemma: How the Price Winners Lose Together

Let’s now add the storage and financing costs that we’ve left out so far. Those who forgo reserves save on these costs and tie up less capital. This allows them to offer lower prices. On the other hand, those who take precautions risk being driven out of the market in a price war. If everyone therefore forgoes stockpiles, everyone remains unprotected. This is the essence of a prisoner’s dilemma: Everyone pursues their own self-interest. As a result, everyone ends up in a worse situation than they could have achieved through collective planning.

Payout matrix for commodity hedging: Both parties hedge: +3/+3. Only one party hedges: −5/+5 or +5/−5. Neither party hedges: −4/−4. Illustrative assessment of competitive advantages and supply risks.

The trap: If the competitor takes precautions, the decision to forgo yields +5 instead of +3. If the competitor does not take precautions, the decision to forgo yields −4 instead of −5. Under these assumptions, competition leads both parties into the fourth quadrant: no precautions, mutual dependence. China’s price advantage secures sales, while competitive pressure among buyers reinforces the dependency.

The government must provide incentives

As long as failing to build reserves promises greater personal gain, the logic of our model leads to the fourth quadrant: Both parties forgo reserves, and both remain dependent. New raw materials partnerships alone will not change this. The government must alter the payout matrix: Those who build reserves must not be at a competitive disadvantage. Those who forgo such measures must not derive a lasting price advantage from it. To this end, the public sector can provide targeted co-financing for reserve buildup and holding costs, linked to mandatory contributions from companies. Collective or government reserves complement this protection. The goal is to make the fourth quadrant less attractive and to establish joint preparedness as an economically viable decision.

Commodity companies are part of the solution

Securing a supply of raw materials requires not only political decisions, but also companies that can actually procure, store, and deliver metals. That is exactly what we do at Noble Elements. We trade in rare earths and technology metals, develop international sources of supply, and maintain physical inventories. In this way, we enable our customers to take proactive measures and reduce their dependence on short-term deliveries. However, for such proactive measures to be economically viable on an industrial scale, the right political incentives are needed.

After all, even the cheapest commodity is of no use if it is not available when it matters most.

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